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Mabel Hannah’s Justice: a contextual re-reading of 
Donoghue v Stevenson
Honni van Rijswijk1
‘I do not think so ill of our jurisprudence as to suppose 
that its principles are so remote from the ordinary needs 
of  civilized  society  and  the  ordinary  claims  it  makes 
upon its members as to deny a legal remedy where there 
is so obviously a social wrong’.2 
‘If law has a soul, then … it is to be found in the law of 
tort and, more particularly, in the far-reaching doctrines 
of negligence’.3
‘I am very poor, and am not worth in all the world the 
sum of Five Pounds, my wearing apparel and the subject 
matter of the said Appeal only excepted…’.4
Abstract
1 Faculty of Law, University of Technology, Sydney.
2 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, 583 (Lord Atkin).
3 Desmond Manderson, Proximity, Levinas and The Soul of the Law (McGill-Queen's University Press 
2006) 4.
4 Affadavit sworn by Mrs Donoghue on February 16, 1931 and attached to petition for leave (Journal of  
the House of Lords 128, 251 cited in  Martin Taylor, ‘Mrs Donoghue’s Journey’,  in Peter Burns and 
Susan Lyons (eds), Donoghue v Stevenson and the Modern Law of Negligence: the Paisley Papers: the  
Proceedings of the Paisley Conference on the Law of Negligence (Continuing Legal Education Society 
of British Columbia, 1991) 19.
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In Donoghue v Stevenson,5 the House of Lords established negligence as 
an  independent  tort  and reformulated  the  responsibility  owed by one 
person  to  another  in  civil  society.  The  accident  of  Mabel  Hannah6 
finding a snail  in her ginger beer became the occasion for the law to 
disrupt  the  (then)  normal  practices  of  manufacture  specifically,  and 
socioeconomic conditions more generally,  by introducing attentiveness 
to vulnerability as a civil ethic.  This essay looks back at the case and 
reads  it  in  its  cultural  and  material  contexts—with  the  intention  of 
illuminating  Lord  Atkin’s  neighbour  principle  within  its  specific 
historical  framework,  and to  look again  at  the  justice  Mabel  Hannah 
received  through  the  decision.  This  reading  will  examine  the  gap 
between law and social justice, and re-contextualise the potential of tort 
law to operate as a kind of civil ethics or system of moral value. In this 
reading I consider the inflections of the neighbour figure, reading the 
case’s Biblical ‘Golden Rule’ alongside the anti-ethics of Nietzsche and 
Freud. I also consider the ongoing paradox of the neighbour as a figure 
for the recognition of suffering.
Introduction
In  Donoghue  v  Stevenson,7 the  House  of  Lords  established  negligence  as  an 
independent tort and reformulated the responsibility owed by one person to another in 
civil society. The case is important for historical reasons and there is no doubt that the 
case matters to contemporary legal interpretation—its ‘radiating effects’ continue to 
resonate into the present.8 As to why this case also matters to a critical understanding 
of tort law, I need to start by telling a story.  This story is already familiar  to most 
lawyers, but bear with me—it still has its surprising elements, parts that were not told 
to us in those first torts lectures. This essay is an attempt to look back at the case and 
5 [1932] AC 562.
6 In the legal pleadings, judgments and in subsequent commentary, Mabel Hannah has been referred to 
as Mrs Mary Donoghue, Mrs May Donoghue and Mrs M’Alister. Following her divorce from her 
husband in 1928, she reverted to her maiden name of McAllister, but was actually known as ‘Mabel 
Hannah’ (Alan Rodger, ‘Mrs Donoghue and Alfenus Varus’ (1988) 41 Current Legal Problems 1, 3-9, 
5). Hannah was her mother’s maiden name and Mabel was the name of her daughter, who died as an 
infant (Rodger, 8). In the House of Lords decision, and in most tort textbooks (where most of us 
encounter her), she is known as ‘Mrs Donoghue’.
7 [1932] AC 562.
8 K Warner, ‘Judicial Reasoning and Precedent: Negligently Inflicted Psychological Injuries’ (1990) 10 
Legal Studies (1) 63, 75.
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read it  in its  cultural  and material  contexts—to understand Lord Atkin’s neighbour 
principle  within  its  specific  historical  framework,  and  to  look  again  at  the  justice 
Mabel  Hannah  received  through  the  decision.  This  reading  will  examine  the  gap 
between law and social justice, and re-contextualise the potential of tort law to operate 
as  a  kind  of  civil  ethics  or  system of  moral  value.  In  this  reading  I  consider  the 
inflections of the neighbour figure, reading the case’s Biblical ‘Golden Rule’ alongside 
the anti-ethics  of Nietzsche and Freud. I  also consider the ongoing paradox of the 
neighbour figure. 
Negligence imposes on everyone a duty of care owed not to the world generally, but to 
those who will be foreseeably injured by a failure to take care; liability is determined 
through the concept of proximity,  or neighbourhood, which both produces the duty 
relationship  between  the  parties,  and  sets  its  limits.  But  the  neighbour  figure  is 
enigmatic.  Who  is  the  speaking—or  listening—subject  encountering  Lord  Atkin’s 
question,  ‘Who,  in  law,  is  my neighbour?’  And who,  in  turn,  is  the  neighbour  so 
considered?  There  is  a  strange  intimacy  in  this  principle,  which  makes  strangers 
neighbours; there is something beautiful in this ethic, something full of hope. And yet 
there are crucial limitations concerning who counts as a neighbour, and the ways in 
which  their  suffering  might  count.  This  contradiction—between  the  ethic  of 
neighbourhood, and those actually helped by the law—is one that might be answered 
through an attentiveness to the historical contexts of the case, and through the critical 
re-telling of its stories. Like all good stories, this one starts with a journey—Mabel 
Hannah’s tram trip from her tenement in the heart of Glasgow to a café in Paisley, 
Scotland. 
It was ten to nine at night on 26 August 1928 when Mabel Hannah, a Glaswegian shop 
assistant, arrived by tram at the Wellmeadow Café, to meet a friend. Soon after she 
arrived, this friend ordered and paid for an ice-cream and ginger beer. The ginger beer 
arrived  in  an  opaque  bottle  and  the  proprietor  of  the  Wellmeadow,  Mr  Francis 
Minchella, poured some ginger beer over the ice-cream, which Mabel Hannah drank.9 
Some time later, according to the pleadings: 
9 For details of the facts of the case, see Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, 562, and the judgment of 
Lord Buckmaster, 566. 
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Her friend then lifted the said ginger-beer bottle and was pouring out the 
remainder of the contents … when a snail, which had been, unknown to 
the pursuer, her friend, or the said Mr Minchella, in the bottle, and was in 
a state of decomposition, floated out of the said bottle. (Art. 2 of Cond.)
Seeing the snail caused Mabel Hannah immediate shock and illness, and over time her 
condition became worse. On 29 August 1928 she consulted a doctor and was found to 
be  suffering  from  gastroenteritis  caused  by  the  snail-infected  ginger-beer.  Her 
condition  further  worsened  and  on  16  September  1928  she  received  emergency 
treatment at the Glasgow Royal Infirmary, suffering repeated vomiting, acute pain in 
her stomach, and mental depression. She was rendered unfit for her employment. She 
lost wages and incurred expense as a result of her injuries and sued the manufacturer of 
the ginger beer, Mr Stevenson, an Aerated-Water Manufacturer, for £500 damages for 
her suffering.10 
Mabel Hannah’s legal position seemed hopeless since, as her friend had bought the 
drink,  the  friend and not  Mabel  Hannah had contracted  with  the  proprietor  of  the 
Wellmeadow: therefore, she could not rely on any implied warranty concerning the 
safety of the drink.11 The friend did, however, notice the address of the manufacturer, 
Mr Stevenson, on the bottle of ginger beer. The only legal recourse open was to sue Mr 
Stevenson in negligence, but at that time, no relationship between manufacturers and 
end  consumers  was  recognised  by  the  law.  There  is  no  information  available  to 
indicate  how  Mabel  Hannah  found  her  lawyer,  Walter  Leechman,  but  she  was 
fortunate in doing so, as he had recently acted in another Scottish case, Mullen v AG 
Bar,12 which  had  also  reached  the  Scottish  Court  of  Sessions  but  had  failed  for 
technical reasons.13 The case of Mullen v AG Bar concerned, improbably, two plaintiffs 
finding a mouse in a bottle of ginger beer (if there is a moral rule arising in these cases, 
it is that one should never drink ginger beer in Scotland). Mabel Hannah’s case was 
10 See Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, 562, and the judgment of Lord Buckmaster, 566. 
11 The gender of the friend is not specified in either the pleadings or the judgment. Taylor speculates that 
the lawyers and judges refrained from referring to the friend as ‘he’ throughout because Mabel Hannah 
was only recently separated from her husband and ‘these were not permissive times’ (Taylor, above n 4,  
19).
12 (1929) SC 461.
13 Taylor  n 4, 6-8.
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sufficiently  distinct  from the  facts  of  Mullen  v  AG  Bar as  to  avoid  its  technical 
difficulties, so Mr Leechman filed a writ in the Scottish Court of Sessions.14
How did these inauspicious, somewhat ridiculous facts change modern personal injury 
law? In the end, the House of Lords found a new relationship of responsibility in law—
not between Mabel Hannah and the proprietor of the café, but between Mabel Hannah 
and the manufacturer of the ginger beer. The most important judgment in the case was 
given by Lord Atkin, who held that although he had no contractual connection to her,  
Mr Stevenson ought to have had someone like Mrs Donoghue ‘in contemplation’ when 
producing  his  ginger  beer.15 The  decision  produced  a  new  duty  of  care  between 
manufacturer  and  consumer,  a  relationship  which,  despite  being  central  to  the 
burgeoning market society of the early twentieth century, had not previously been the 
subject of tort law. Before this case, manufacturers could send harmful products out 
into the world with impunity except towards a limited class of people, with whom they 
had a contract. This point was key to Lord Buckmaster’s dissent in Donoghue—he was 
critical of the social and economic consequences of the new flexibility of tort, as well 
as the threat a more powerful tort law posed to the role of contract law in regulating 
relationships. He focused especially on the significance of the demoted role of contract 
to the future of trade:
The principle contended for must be this: that the manufacturer, or indeed 
the repairer, of any article, apart entirely from contract, owes a duty to any 
person  by  whom  the  article  is  lawfully  used  to  see  that  it  has  been 
carefully constructed. …The principle of tort lies completely outside the 
region where such considerations apply,  and the duty,  if it  exists, must 
extend  to  every  person  who,  in  lawful  circumstances,  uses  the  article 
made.16 
However,  the  case  is  important  beyond  the  introduction  of  this  specific  consumer 
relationship, since Lord Atkin’s ‘neighbour principle’ was a formulation of a general 
duty of care, which redefined responsibility between individuals in civil society. This 
relationship of duty changed tort  law, from a legal  responsibility based on specific 
14 Ibid 4.
15 At 580.
16 At 578.
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categories to one that recognised a general rationale of liability. The case established 
that tort possessed an underlying logic. Negligence law thereby became adaptive and 
opened up to new categories of injury and relationship that had previously not been 
imagined  by  the  courts,  thereby  ‘increasing  social  obligation’.17 In  his  dissenting 
judgment,  Lord  Buckmaster  noted,  with  a  tone  of  crankiness,  the  expansive 
consequences of this reasoning: ‘If one step,’ he said, ‘why not fifty?’.18 
A New Morality: making neighbours out of strangers 
It  is significant  that  the general rationale  introduced in  Donoghue v Stevenson was 
based on moral value, and that moral value continues to be of importance to tort law. 
David Owen calls moral responsibility the ‘basic cement’ of negligence;19 Peter Cane 
argues negligence law is essentially an ethical system of responsibility;20 and Desmond 
Manderson emphasises the ways in which tort thereby differs from other areas of the 
law: 
It  is  not  the  outcome of  an  agreement  founded on self-interest,  like  a 
contract. It is not a duty owed to the community as a whole and acted on 
by the State, like criminal law. It describes a  personal  responsibility we 
owe to others which has been placed upon us without our consent. It is a 
kind of debt that each of us owes to others although we never consciously 
accrued it. Thus it raises, in a distinctly personal way, one of the oldest 
questions of law itself: ‘Am I my brother’s keeper?’21
Tort law has been thought of as a kind of moral praxis—as the real-world, textured 
compliment to philosophical abstraction. Peter Cane argues that:
…by  reason  of  law’s  institutional  resources,  the  legal  ‘version’  of 
responsibility has a richness of detail lacking in the moral ‘version’ of 
responsibility. Because law is underwritten by the coercive power of the 
state, courts cannot leave disputes about responsibility… unresolved…
17 Jane Stapleton, ‘The Golden Thread at the Heart of Tort Law: Protection of the Vulnerable’ in Peter  
Cane (ed) Centenary Essays for the High Court of Australia (LexisNexis Sydney, 2004) 61.
18 At 578.
19 David Owen, Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law (Oxford University Press, 1995) 223.
20 Peter Cane, Centenary Essays for the High Court of Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2004) 24-25.
21 Manderson n 3, 5.
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Morality can afford to be vague and indeterminate to an extent that law 
cannot.22 
Further, Cane argues that ‘outside of the law, there are relatively few norm-enforcing 
institutions in civil society’.23
Here I would like to revisit  Donoghue v Stevenson to demonstrate the ways in which 
the question of moral value is not straightforward in the case: morality functions in 
complicated ways, and in relation to a number of other values. These include economic 
values, as well as the value the individual holds in relation to collective interests. In 
formulating  liability  based  on  the  figure  of  the  neighbour,  Lord  Atkin  rejected  a 
prevalent  habit  of  judicial  interpretation  that  was  not  only  based  on  established 
categories, but which proceeded incrementally through analogy. The formulation of a 
general duty was a creative leap in itself, but it also introduced creativity as a practice 
in judicial recognition of tort claims, and meant judges in future cases need not rely on 
pre-existing  categories  in  determining  claims.  Lord  Atkin  explicitly  noted  that  his 
general formulation of duty was new for tort law, and implicitly, that it arose through a 
practice of connection:  
It  is  remarkable  how difficult  it  is  to  find  in  the  English  authorities 
statements of general application defining the relations between parties 
that give rise to the duty. The Courts are concerned with the particular 
relations which come before them in actual litigation, and it is sufficient 
to say whether the duty exists in those circumstances. The result is that 
the Courts have been engaged upon an elaborate classification of duties 
as they exist in respect of property, whether real or personal, with further 
divisions as to ownership, occupation or control, and distinctions based 
on  the  particular  relations  of  the  one  side  or  the  other,  whether 
manufacturer,  salesman or landlord,  customer,  tenant,  stranger,  and so 
on.24 
22 Cane n 19, 12.
23 Ibid 25.
24 At 580.
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Lord Atkin replaced the old practice of interpretation based on categorization with a 
method that was not only much more open, but which was (and still is) much more 
difficult to define. He continued by protesting that law and morality are and should be 
distinct. But then he went ahead and formulated a general principle that was based on 
morality anyway:
At present I content myself with pointing out that in English law there 
must be, and is, some general conception of relations giving rise to a duty 
of  care,  of  which  the  particular  cases  found  in  the  books  are  but 
instances. The liability for negligence, whether you style it such or treat 
it as in other systems as a species of ‘culpa,’ is no doubt based upon a 
general  public  sentiment  of moral  wrongdoing for which the offender 
must pay. But acts or omissions which any moral code would censure 
cannot in a practical world be treated so as to give a right to every person 
injured by them to demand relief. In this way rules of law arise which 
limit the range of complainants and the extent of their remedy. The rule 
that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law, you must not injure 
your  neighbour;  and  the  lawyer’s  question,  Who  is  my  neighbour? 
receives a restricted reply. You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or 
omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure 
your neighbour. Who, then, in law is my neighbour? The answer seems 
to be—persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I 
ought  reasonably to  have them in contemplation  as  being  so affected 
when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in 
question.25 
What kind of morality is this, which makes neighbours out of strangers? Scholars have 
noted not only the moral foundation of the neighbour principle, but also its ambivalent 
status  as principle. Stapleton argues ‘There is no test … there can be no ‘duty test,’ 
given what it is that judges do under the cloak of this analytic  label’.26 In place of 
principle, we might think of tort as being organized by a flexible series of practices, 
which include an ethic of neighbourhood, and to which the aesthetics of the neighbour 
25 Ibid.
26 Stapleton n 16, 60.
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figure is central. The continuing significance of Lord Atkin’s formulation lies not only 
in  its  assertion  of  a  moral  standard,  but  also  in  its  function in  establishing  the 
importance of certain kinds of relationship in law. The case changed the point of view 
of manufacturers,  and required  them to have consumers  ‘in  contemplation.’  It  also 
changed the material practices of manufacture, since manufacturers had to be attentive 
to the risks of their products in new ways. Most profoundly, it challenged the courts’ 
deference to the interests of ‘society’ and ‘economy’ (as articulated most forcefully by 
Lord  Buckmaster)  and  countered  these  aggregating  forces  with  a  sympathy  for 
particular  relationships,  particular  individuals,  and  for  the  vulnerability  that  these 
particularities exhibited against the forces of society and economy.
Lord  Atkin’s  emphasis  on  a  kind  of  particularity—a  relationship  of  specific 
responsibility  between  neighbours—arises  through  the  language  of  his  judgment, 
especially  in  its  most  famous  passage.  He  inhabits  multiple  points  of  view  as  he 
describes the duty of care. To begin with, the question of liability is expressed in the 
first-person singular as ‘the lawyer’s question, Who is my neighbour?’ The next shift 
in  point  of  view  occurs  by  way  of  an  answer  to  this  question:  ‘You  must  take 
reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be 
likely  to  injure  your  neighbour.’  Here,  the  subject  addressed  in  second-person  is 
ambiguous: at once singular and plural, particular and universal. Lord Atkin returns to 
the first person point of view: ‘Who then, in law, is my neighbour?’ and stays in first 
person to elaborate  the obligation of care towards ‘persons who are so closely and 
directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as 
being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are 
called  in  question.’  The  imperative  operates  towards  both  self  and  other.  It  is  a 
‘lawyer’s question,’ but the question needs to be asked by all members of civil society 
who might be potentially liable to their neighbours. 
The duty of care is a duty between individuals, and is quite different in quality from the 
social and economic interests defended by Lord Buckmaster—the duty is not owed to 
the entire world, but to those particular individuals within reasonable contemplation of 
the  doer’s  acts.  Through  Lord  Atkin’s  rhetorical  moves,  the  anonymous  group 
referenced by social and economic interests is dissolved, as each member is required to 
consider the neighboirs who may be harmed by her actions or inactions, and to have 
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these neighbours in mind as she goes about her life. In doing so, a person cannot rely 
on established categories of liability to determine her obligation to the other—rather, 
one must have in mind a flexible approach towards obligation, and be open to multiple 
and changing responsibilities. The neighbourly mind is a pre-emptive, relational mind. 
Tort law thereby has the potential to produce a strange new intimacy between people, 
through this pre-emptive consideration for the other. The obligation is a kind of civil 
ethics which is also a legal imperative underwritten by economic consequences. 
Fetish and Mystification: from dangerous commodities to careless minds
The  formulation  of  civil  ethics  in  the  case  occurred  specifically  through  the 
relationship between manufacturer and consumer. By emphasizing the civil nature of 
this relationship, Lord Atkin challenged the role of economics in determining relations 
between people and thereby criticized the organization of relationships in the modern, 
market society. Lord Atkin did so not only through his articulation of the neighbour 
principle, but also by reconceptualising the object at the centre of the case, the snail in 
the bottle. The snail’s significance in the previous legal proceedings lay in its status as 
a dangerous object but Lord Atkin argued that its real significance lay in its status as an 
effect of a negligent mind. In Lord Atkin’s formulation of liability, the snail-object was 
of peripheral importance and the neighbour-subject moved to the foreground. The birth 
of negligence law as we know it involved judicial wrestling of the object to reveal the 
subject behind it, thereby pushing against the reification process of capitalism. For this 
reason  it  is  worthwhile  tracing  the  story  of  dangerous  objects  and  their  eventual 
disappearance in Lord Atkin’s judgment. 
Early tort cases were captivated by dangerous objects. There was a sense in which 
these things  were given a  strange kind of  agency,  in  ways  that  resonate  with  Bill 
Brown’s theorization of the object in his essay ‘Thing Theory’.27 Here Brown describes 
the relationship between danger and the defamiliarisation of objects, arguing: 
We begin to confront the thingness of objects when they stop working 
for us: when the drill breaks, when the car stalls, when the windows get  
filthy, when their flow within the circuits of production and distribution, 
consumption  and exhibition,  has been arrested,  however  momentarily. 
27 Bill Brown, ‘Thing Theory’ (2001) 28 Critical Inquiry 1, 1-21.
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The story of objects asserting themselves as things, then, is the story of a 
changed relation to the human subject and thus the story of how the thing 
really names less an object than a particular subject-object relation.28
In cases in which dangerous things injured people, commodities took on a life of their 
own. Through their transformation, and by performing in ways that were not expected, 
these objects  impinged on and shocked with their  sudden violence.  They were the 
monsters of commodity capitalism, the horror story of capitalism’s dark side.
The  law  concerning  the  manufacture  of  objects  up  until  the  case  of  Donoghue  v  
Stevenson held that liability for defective or dangerous products could only be based in 
contract. There were only two exceptions where other duties were found: first, in cases 
of fraud, where any manufacturer with a mind wicked enough to knowingly send a 
defective object out into the world was held liable for the damage the object inflicted 
on unsuspecting consumers; and second, in cases in which the object was held to be 
dangerous in itself. In the second case, manufacturers were only obliged to be careful 
with  respect  to  objects  that  were  clearly  dangerous—not  objects  that  were  merely 
annoying or sickening—and so there developed a substantial body of case law on the 
question of dangerousness.
There was no evidence that Mr Stevenson knew that his bottle of ginger beer contained 
a  snail,  so  Mrs  Donoghue’s  case  initially  relied  on  the  second  category  of 
dangerousness. Mrs Donoghue’s solicitor was prepared to say that the snail was in fact 
dangerous and framed the case by arguing it was ‘the duty of the defender to exercise 
the greatest care in order that snails would not get into the said bottle, render[ing] the 
said ginger beer dangerous and harmful ….’.29 In response, Mr Stevenson’s solicitor 
argued that the law had ‘firearms or poisons’ in mind, not snails, ‘that it could in no 
way be said that a snail in a bottle was dangerous in itself,’ and further, that ‘ginger 
beer is obviously not per se dangerous’.30 Mr Stevenson’s lawyers argued:
It is impossible, as the Lord Justice Clerk said in Mullen v AG Barr, to 
assimilate  the  position  of  a  dealer  in  gelignite  with  the  position  of  a 
28 Ibid 68.
29 At 565.
30 At 568.
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dealer in ginger beer. And there would be scant logical justification for 
holding that ginger beer containing a snail, the sight of which may cause 
a merely temporary sickness in one consumer is, per se dangerous, while 
a patent lamp with a defect which may cause an explosion injuring half a 
dozen people is held not to be per se dangerous.31
Lord Moncrieff, in the initial Court of Sessions hearing, was prepared to find the snail,  
and food more generally, a danger in itself:
The  danger  of  infection  is  such  as  is  or  should  be  known  in  every 
domestic kitchen and still room. Tainted food when offered for sale is, in 
my opinion, amongst the most subtly potent of ‘dangerous goods,’ and to 
deal in or prepare such food is highly relevant to infer a duty.32
But the Scottish appeal judges disagreed. When the majority of the Scottish appeal 
judges  heard  and  rejected  Mrs  Donoghue’s  claim,  they  followed  their  own recent 
decision in Mullen v AG Barr,33 concerning the mouse in the ginger beer. Lord Justice-
Clerk said:
Now, the only difference—and, so far as I can see, it is not a material 
difference—between that case and this case is that there we were dealing 
with a mouse in a ginger-beer bottle, and here we are dealing with a snail 
in  a  ginger-beer  bottle.  Quoad  ultra the  circumstances  appear  to  be 
identical.34 
Accordingly, the Second Division of the Court of Session reviewed the authorities and 
dismissed Mrs Donoghue’s action, affirming their earlier principle in the mouse case. 
The  judges  in  both  Court  of  Sessions  hearings  cited  a  number  of  cases  from the 
nineteenth  century  onwards,  which  had  dealt  with  the  issue.  They  found  that  a 
defective railway wagon was held not to be dangerous in itself,35 nor was an exploding 
31 At 570.
32 Appeal Papers 6.
33 (1929) SC 461.
34 Appeal Papers 22.
35 Caledonian Railway Company v Warwick, 25 R (HL).
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paraffin lamp.36 Defective hairwash was found to be dangerous,37 and gas was found to 
be inherently dangerous.38 In his minority judgment in the House of Lords decision, 
Lord Buckmaster found, referring to the American case of MacPherson v Buick Motor  
Co,39 that ‘a motor car might reasonably be regarded as a dangerous article’.40
The story of Donoghue v Stevenson is in part a story about the reversal of this order of 
the object’s power over the subject, as Lord Atkin revealed these objects to be the 
logical end effects of market processes and systems, where these processes were not 
abstract  and distant,  but  particular  and proximate,  produced by people  such as  the 
rather commonplace Mr Stevenson. Lord Atkin took hold of any seeming monsters 
lurking in this story and pushed them firmly back into the mind of their creator, the 
manufacturer. Lord Atkin crisply dismissed the question of dangerousness altogether:
I  do not  find it  necessary to  discuss  at  length  the cases  dealing  with 
duties where the thing is dangerous, or, in the narrower category, belongs 
to  a  class  of  things  which  are  dangerous  in  themselves.  I  regard  the 
distinction as an unnatural one so far as it is used to serve as a logical 
differentiation by which to distinguish the existence or non-existence of a 
legal right.41
Lord Atkin saw a problem in a social  order where relations between subjects were 
broken up by the interposition of objects. Lord Atkin’s re-reading of the dangerous 
object  thereby  connected  him  to  a  very  unexpected  genre  of  evaluation—that  of 
Marxism, as Lord Atkin’s neighbour principle is essentially a refusal of commodity 
fetishism. According to Karl Marx, ‘The fetishism of the commodity,’ lies in the fact 
that ‘a definite social relation between men themselves … assumes here, for them, the 
fantastic form of a relation between things’.42 In  Capital (1867), Marx deconstructed 
the ‘thingness’ of commodities, arguing that commodities obtain their value not from 
inherent  qualities,  but  rather  from their  place  in  interconnected  discourses  (across 
36 Longmeid v Holliday 6 WH & G Exchequer Reports 761.
37 George v Skivington LR 5 Ex. 1.
38 Dominion Natural Gas Co v Collins and Perkins [1909] AC 640, 646.
39 217 NY 382.
40 At 577.
41 At 589.
42 Karl Marx,  Capital: Edited with an Introduction and Notes by David McLellan (Oxford University 
Press, 2008) 165.
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economic, cultural and social domains). Marx arrived at this conclusion through his 
observation that in the nineteenth century the value of commodities came to exceed 
their use value; this end value did not arise out of the object itself but rather was an 
effect of the process of exchange.43 
Lord  Atkin  swept  away  the  consideration  of  objects-dangerous-in-themselves  as  a 
ground of liability and replaced this question with a very different consideration: the 
mind of the manufacturer who produced the object. The terms of inquiry shifted from a 
debate  about  which  objects  might  be  considered  dangerous  in  themselves—an 
exploding lamp? a cart that was packed unevenly?—to a debate that emphasized the 
mind  and  processes  that  produced  the  object.  The  unlikely  result  of  this  tension 
between object and subject is a new ethics based on an act of imagination that focuses 
not on the relationship between the object and the person injured but on the creator of 
the object and the person injured. The quality of mind in this new formulation is not 
the wicked mind, as in fraud cases, which required actual knowledge of defectiveness, 
but the negligent mind, the mind that fails to pay attention. In producing his concept of 
neighbourhood, Lord Atkin began by quoting Lord Esher in Le Lievre v Gould,44 who 
used a spatial metaphor to frame responsibility: 
If one man is near to another, or near to the property of another, a duty 
lies on him not to do that which may cause a personal injury to that other, 
or may injure his property.45
Lord Atkin combined the spatial framework of Lord Esher’s dictum with the parable of 
the Good Samaritan,  making neighbourhood a mental  rather  than,  or as  well  as,  a 
spatial condition. In addition to the economic impact of liability, this new formulation 
changed the mental and material  conditions of manufacture: it  meant manufacturers 
must  have  consumers  ‘in  contemplation’  when  going  about  their  business.  The 
manufacturer needed to think of his entire manufacturing process with end-consumers 
in  mind,  to  consider  multiple  circumstances  in  which  people  might  consume  his 
product, and to act with care respect those circumstances to prevent injury. 
43 Ibid 163-177.
44 [1893] 1 QB 491, 497, 504.
45 At 504, cited by Lord Atkin 582, emphasis in original.
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Mabel Hannah, when sitting in her café, had no awareness of how the snail came to be 
in the bottle. In fact, the inexplicability of the snail probably caused a large part of her 
shock,  which  was narrated  as  a  moment  of  recognition:  Mabel  Hannah’s  suffering 
began not when she initially ingested the snail but when the decomposed snail ‘floated’ 
out of the bottle and she realized what her body had already taken in. In the process of 
investigating the cause of the accident,  Mabel Hannah’s lawyers  deconstructed this 
shock experience, revealing it to be an effect of a chain of specific events. Shock here 
was not the effect of a distant series of processes and figures only intimated in the text, 
but  rather  caused by a  particular  party with  a  negligent  mind,  who could  be  held 
accountable for both actions and omissions. The law asserted authority over the shock 
experience: it showed that, although dangerous commodities might produce shocks that 
were experienced as coming out of nowhere, there was, in fact, a certain cause, which 
the legal process could reveal. Mabel Hannah’s lawyers demonstrated that the shock 
she  experienced  should  not  have  come  as  a  surprise,  given  the  careless,  even 
disgusting, methods Mr Stevenson employed in his manufacturing processes. Mabel 
Hannah’s lawyers alleged: 
[T]hat the defender's system of working his business was defective, in 
respect that his ginger beer bottles were washed and allowed to stand in 
places to which it was obvious that snails had freedom of access from 
outside the defender's premises, and in which, indeed, snails and slimy 
trails  of snails  were frequently found. … The defender well  knew, or 
ought to have known, of the frequent presence of snails in those parts of 
his premises where the ginger beer bottles were washed and dried, and, 
further, ought to have known of the danger of small animals (including 
snails) getting into his ginger beer bottles. (Art. 3 of Cond.)
The writ in the case drew attention not only to the general conditions of the factory, but 
to the particular,  offending snail,  with respect  to which Mr Stevenson had specific 
responsibilities: 
The pursuer believes and avers that the said snail, in going into the said 
bottle, left on its path a slimy trail, which should have been obvious to 
anyone inspecting the said bottle before the ginger beer was put into it. In 
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any event, the said trail of the snail should easily have been discovered 
on the bottle before the bottle was sealed, and a proper (or indeed any) 
inspection would have revealed the presence of the said trail and the said 
snail, and the said bottle of ginger beer with the snail in it would not have 
been placed for sale in the said shop. (Art 4. of Cond.)
The  pleadings  represented  capitalism  as  a  constellation  of  processes,  built  on  the 
actions of many particular individuals, just as the shock was received by a particular 
individual. By placing the figures of manufacturer and consumer together side-by-side, 
as neighbours, the case revealed the disguised violence of capitalism’s excesses. In 
doing so,  the case championed the rights  of  all  consumers  of  ‘articles  of common 
household  use’;46 of  such things  as  ginger  beer,  washing powder and chocolates—
objects that had none of the sex appeal of things that have had greater claim on the 
imagination of trauma, such as bombs and even steam trains, but which nevertheless 
had been the cause of everyday injuries.
Moral Value and Power: the cultural context of Donoghue v Stevenson
Donoghue  v  Stevenson contains  a  number  of  threads  that  are  true  to  the  spirit  of 
modernism: a clash of interests between the very rich and very poor; a narrative of 
consumption and new capitalism; and the intersection of abstract, lofty legal principles 
with the modest, even embarrassing claim of shock arising from indigestion. But the 
appearance of the neighbour as a way to organise moral value is somewhat surprising 
in  the  cultural  context  of  1932.  In  contrast  to  literary  modernism’s  traumatised, 
anonymous crowds and blasé flâneurs, who wandered the streets in loneliness, chaos 
and  immanent  peril,  either  hopelessly  sensitive  or  hopelessly  blunted  by  random 
onslaughts, the sudden proximity produced by modern conditions—so sudden and so 
proximate in the case of accidents causing personal injury—became the occasion in 
law to create a relationship of connection, based on, of all things, neighbourly duty and 
responsibility.  Modernity  is  associated  with  a  sentiment  of  ‘ideological 
shelterlessness,’  formed  in a  ‘postsacred,  postfeudal  world  in  which all  norms and 
values are open to question’.47 Alisdair MacIntyre describes this local context of the 
46 At 584.
47 Singer, Ben, ‘Modernity, Hyperstimulus, and the Rise of Popular Sensationalism’ in Leo Charney and 
Vanessa  Schwartz (eds),  Cinema and the Invention of  Modern  Life (University  of  California  Press, 
1995) 72-99, 72.
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meaninglessness  of  ethical  value  in  his  book  After  Virtue.48 In  1903,  MacIntyre 
explains, GE Moore published Principia Ethica, which replaced a system of ethics that 
was duty-based with what has become known as ethical subjectivism or emotivism.49 
Moore  asserted  that  the  value  of  the  ‘good’  was  relative  and  unprovable:  as  an 
‘intuition,’ it could be supported by neither evidence nor reasoning; in his view, ‘no 
action  is  ever  right  or  wrong  as  such’.50 Principia  Ethica was  immediately  and 
enthusiastically  embraced  by British  modernists,  largely  because  it  denied  the  late 
nineteenth-century duty-based ethics of their parents. John Maynard Keynes wrote on 
the  occasion  of  its  publication:  ‘it  was  exciting,  exhilarating,  the  beginning  of  a 
renaissance, the opening of a new heaven on earth’.51 Leonard Woolf described it as:
…substituting for the religious and philosophical nightmares, delusions, 
hallucinations  in  which  Jehovah,  Christ  and St  Paul,  Plato,  Kant  and 
Hegel had entangled us, the fresh air and pure light of common sense.52
On the continent,  Freud addressed ethics in  Civilization and Its Discontents  (1929), 
and explicitly rejected the imperative of the Golden Rule—he destabilized morality as 
a natural given, revealing it to be an effect of contests of power. Like Lord Atkin,  
Freud used the neighbour figure to explain his idea of civil  ethics, but with a very 
different effect.  Freud emphasized the hidden aggression behind the relationship of 
neighbourhood; he criticized the demand to love one’s neighbour as a basis for ethical 
behaviour, arguing that this demand is irrational and against our instincts. Freud argued 
that  physical  proximity,  far  from producing neighbourly sympathy,  actually  incited 
aggression:
[M]en are not gentle creatures who want to be loved, and who at the most 
can defend themselves  if  they are attacked;  they are,  on the contrary, 
creatures among whose instinctual endowments is to be reckoned a 
powerful share of aggressiveness. As a result, their neighbour is for them 
not only a potential helper or  sexual  object,  but  also  someone  who 
48 Alisdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (2007). 
49 Ibid 14-16.
50 Ibid 15, emphasis in original.
51 Quoted ibid 14.
52 Quoted ibid 16.
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tempts them to satisfy their aggressiveness on him, to exploit his capacity 
for work without compensation, to use him sexually without his consent, 
to seize his possessions, to humiliate him, to cause him pain, to torture 
and kill him.53
For Freud, the instincts that require the regulation of civil society erupt precisely at the 
intersection  of  the  public  and  private  spheres—that  is,  between  neighbours.  Civil 
society’s  response to this  aggression,  which it  calls  ‘ethics,’  is  in fact  a repressive 
mechanism based on a power relationship: 
Civilization,  therefore,  obtains mastery over the individual's dangerous 
desire for aggression by weakening and disarming it and by setting up an 
agency within him to watch over it, like a garrison in a conquered city.54
But  Lord  Atkin’s  principle  is  not  only  an  assertion  of  moral  value:  it  is  also  an 
instrumental  morality  that  reorganized  power  relationships.  The  power  dynamic 
between manufacturer and consumer was reorganized through the duty of care which, 
articulated in a moral register, countered the excesses and ‘amorality of the market 
society’55—its carelessness and its violence—by supporting the claims of consumers. 
The moral discourse in the case therefore met and superseded another value that had 
snuck into both culture and law—the unstated but holy value of the bottom line. 
The specific protection afforded to the consumer through the case significantly affected 
the material positions of consumers and producers. But the case had wider effects on 
the  politics  of  civil  society beyond  the  specific  relationship  between producer  and 
consumer. The neighbourhood principle also acted partly as a place-holder to counter 
formulations of liability which privileged social and economic interests over specific 
relationships and specific harm. The neighbourhood principle insisted on evaluating 
liability through particular relationships which were not formulaic. It therefore opposed 
the utilitarian ethic not only of law-as-economics but of other systems that privilege 
‘the social’ domain, or the collective, over the individual: recourse to both economic 
53 Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontents (Norton, 2005) 110-111.
54 Ibid 112.
55 Walter Benjamin, Illuminations (Harcourt, Brace & World) 159. 
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and social values reference value as an aggregation of many interests. Essentially, Lord 
Atkin’s version of morality introduced into tort  law a function or technique which 
protected individual vulnerability from being as easily subordinated to the collective 
interests of society and economy. For Jane Stapleton, vulnerability is the central value 
of tort law, the ‘golden thread’ that forms the ‘core moral concern of tort law’.56 But 
the value of vulnerability holds political, as well as moral value. The central place of 
vulnerability  to  tort  has  determined  its  modern  role  in  law and society,  and cases 
continue to stage the competition between the values of vulnerability and individuality 
against  the  aggregating  forces  of  society  and  economy.  Donoghue  v  Stevenson 
established  tort  law  as  a  site  in  which  individuals  could  not  only  seek  individual 
justice, but also launch systemic critiques against injustices. 
Conclusion: measuring the gap between law and justice  
Tort law shows kindness to the neighbour.  The accident of Mabel Hannah finding a 
snail in her ginger beer became the occasion for the law to disrupt the (then) normal 
practices of manufacture specifically,  and socioeconomic conditions more generally, 
by  introducing  attentiveness  to  vulnerability  as  a  civil  ethic.  The  neighbourhood 
principle also asserted vulnerability as a value relevant to commercial  practices,  by 
impacting financially on defendants through the language of the bottom line. The case 
therefore  reconceptualized  economic  spaces  as  civic  spaces.  The  kinds  of  injuries 
captured  by  the  figure  of  the  neighbour  and  the  relationship  of  responsibility 
subsequently made visible new injuries that had previously been invisible to the law—
just as the injury to the end-consumer had been, prior to Donoghue v Stevenson. The 
relationship of everyday conditions to suffering thereby became a continuing question 
in  tort  law,  Lord  Atkin’s  judgment  providing  a  mode  of  recognition  for  new 
relationships and injuries. As the processes of market society worked to commercialize 
all spaces, tort law potentially provided a civilizing buffer. 
There are contradictions in the case between the ethic of neighbourhood and the power 
of  law.  Lord  Atkin’s  neighbour  principle  functions  partly  as  an  anti-capitalist 
sentiment.  His judgment is a kind of  noblesse oblige that is at odds with corporate 
power—but its ethic of social justice is still supported by power (Lord Atkin’s peerage 
and connections to the landed gentry). It is just a different kind of power to that which 
56 Stapleton n 16, 135.
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arose through the market economy. But the more significant contradiction in the case 
concerns Mabel Hannah. Mabel Hannah’s small legal story connects one aspect of the 
everyday violence and hardship of her life to wider social and economic worlds. The 
case made Mabel Hannah’s shock a ‘social wrong’,57 thereby fully articulating a civil 
ethics of trauma, a framework which was present, but not fully emergent, in earlier 
nervous shock cases. On the face of the text,  Donoghue v Stevenson is a story of a 
consumer who was sickened and shocked when she saw a decomposed snail float out 
of a bottle. The story seems straightforward, and not particularly tragic: there is even 
something  ridiculous  about  being  injured  by  a  snail.  The  shock  here  is  more 
domesticated and controlled than the train or street accidents, which were the focus of 
nervous shock litigation. The shock is more personalized, local and manageable, but it 
is  nevertheless  strange  and  arresting.  It  was  through  degrees  of  silliness  and 
seriousness, and of high and low registers of experience, that the injury of ingesting a 
snail changed the civil law so significantly. A kind of familiarity is generated by this 
narrative, because it does not involve death or terrible injury; and familiarity arises too 
from the fact that the case deals with common, household, consumable objects. But it 
is a familiarity that, in the end, is the familiarity of the uncanny: more familiar because 
it concerns an everyday object, but stranger because this ordinariness has spun out-of-
control. The image of the snail in the bottle is funny, weird and embarrassing. The 
snail  appeared  unexpectedly  in  the  Wellmeadow  Café,  and  it  again  appeared 
unexpectedly in the texts and discussion of the House of Lords, where it was discussed, 
on 10 December 1931:
…in a committee room of the House of Lords overlooking the gardens 
beside  the  Thames  where  tea  is  served,  [where  the]  five  Law Lords, 
dressed as was their custom in ordinary suits, sat before a fireplace to 
hear argument in May Donoghue’s case.58 
There is something uncanny about the snail. But there is also something not quite right 
about  the  way  in  which  the  law  registers  Mabel  Hannah’s  suffering  through  the 
narrative  of the snail-in-the-bottle.  For  Freud, ‘… the term ‘uncanny’  (unheimlich) 
applies to everything that was intended to remain secret, hidden away, and has come 
57 At 583.
58 Taylor n 4, 5. 
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into the open’.59 In German, ‘uncanny’ is  unheimlich, or unhomely, and the uncanny 
arises out of the ambiguity of home and domestic life. In theorizing the concept, Freud 
relied on a range of domestic objects and body parts: eyes, eye-sockets, animated dolls, 
‘severed limbs, a severed head, a hand detached from the arm [and] feet that dance by 
themselves’.60 The concept is also heavily gendered—in many of the examples Freud 
adduces,  women  are  construed  as  occluded  sinkholes  of  ambiguity,  through  their 
connection with quotidian objects such as dolls and eyes. 
Mabel Hannah’s suffering arises in the law through this strange and disturbing story. 
At the same time, it is clear that Mabel Hannah touches lawyers in some way—there is 
a sense that, at its best, the common law should stand up for the shop assistant who 
suffers following the ingestion of a snail. In 1990, Martin R Taylor, a Canadian lawyer  
and retired judge, organized a ‘Pilgrimage to Paisley’ to honor the role of Donoghue v 
Stevenson in the development of the law of negligence.61 In 1988, Allan Rodger, now 
Lord Rodger of the House of Lords, conducted extensive research on the life of May 
Donoghue, consulting a range of legal  and State records. In an article  published in 
Current Legal Problems, he described the daily hardship of her impoverished life. This 
research casts Mabel Hannah as a much more tragic figure than is apparent on the face 
of the legal text.
Mabel Hannah had to be tenacious in pursuing her case, as not only did she have to see 
her  case  through the  appeals  process,  but  she  had to  do so  with  the  assistance  of 
counsel who were willing to act without pay.  Further, she had to gain the status of 
pauper  in  the  courts,  since  she  had no means  to  put  up  security  for  costs.  Mabel 
Hannah’s petition to appear in forma pauperis was supported by an affidavit in which 
she swore:
…I am very poor, and am not worth in all the world the sum of Five 
Pounds, my wearing apparel and the subject matter of the said Appeal 
59 Sigmund Freud, in David McLintock and Hugh Haughton (eds) The Uncanny (Penguin Books, 2003) 
132. 
60 Ibid 140, 149, 138-40, 150.
61 Taylor is currently in possession of the ‘genuine Stevenson bottle’ (Taylor n 4, 19).
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only  excepted,  and  am,  by  reason  of  such  my  poverty,  unable  to 
prosecute the said Appeal.62 
Attached to her petition was a certificate of poverty signed by a minister and two elders 
of her church, attesting to Mabel Hannah’s poverty.63 
Prior to her case, Mabel Hannah had experienced a number of traumatic events. She 
gave birth to three premature children between 1917 and 1920, all of whom died.64 The 
incidence of premature births is consistent with her poverty, and there is evidence that 
malnutrition was a factor in the death of her daughter Mabel in 1920.65 In 1928 she 
separated from her husband, and she and her surviving son Henry moved in with her 
husband’s family.66 In addition to these events, she endured the quotidian shocks and 
traumas  of  a  working  class  woman.  Following  the  case,  her  life  continued  to  be 
difficult. She carried on working as a shop-assistant, divorced her husband and moved 
to a Corporation flat. She died of a heart-attack on the 19th March 1958 at Gartloch 
Mental Hospital, outside Glasgow, at the age of fifty-nine.67 Whether Mabel Hannah in 
fact  received  material  benefit  from  the  case  is  also  a  matter  of  contention.  Mr 
Stevenson died before she was able to complete her claim but the rumor is that the case 
settled  out  of  court  for  the amount  of  £200,  which  would  have been a  substantial 
payment for Mabel Hannah, equivalent to two year’s wages.68 At her death, her total 
estate was worth £364.69
So what story would Mabel Hannah tell of Donoghue v Stevenson, because she is both 
a central figure to tort, and yet marginal to the forces of law, power and society? The 
main source of Mabel Hannah’s suffering was, no doubt, not finding the snail in the 
62 Affadavit sworn on February 16, 1931 and attached to petition for leave (163 Journal of the House of  
Lords 128, 251 cited in Rodger n 1, 19).
63 Ibid 4.
64 Rodger n 1, 5 and 18-19.
65 Rodger n 1, 5.
66 Ibid.
67 Rodger n 1, 9.
68 The amount of settlement is noted in Salmond and Heuston on the Law of Tort 346, cited in Rodger n 
1, 21. There is no information concerning what kind of shop Mrs Donoghue worked in, but if she had 
worked in the food or clothes industry, her average annual wage payments in 1932 would have been 
between £94.6 and £114.9 (De Grazia and Furlough,  The Sex of Things: Gender and Consumption in  
Historical Perspective (1996) 252, based on calculations in Chapman and Knight, Wages and Salaries  
in the United Kingdom, 1920—1938 (1953)).
69 Taylor n 4, 20.
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bottle of ginger beer, but her difficult daily life, which was nonetheless fairly typical 
for her gender and social  class. However,  it  was the peculiar  and isolated event of 
finding this snail which made her suffering—framed as ‘shock’—visible to the law. 
The legal narrative captures one discrete injury of Mabel Hannah’s life, but fails to 
represent  her  sustained  harms,  including  the  damage  caused  by  poverty  and  her 
marginal social status. The law represents the injury she received as a consumer, but is 
this  the  social  injury  that  the  law should  have  been  most  eager  to  recognize  and 
redress? Lord Atkin stated in his judgment: 
I do not think so ill of our jurisprudence as to suppose that its principles 
are  so  remote  from  the  ordinary  needs  of  civilized  society  and  the 
ordinary claims it makes upon its members as to deny a legal remedy 
where there is so obviously a social wrong.70
But what counts as a social wrong and how does a particular injury come to matter to 
the law? Why does the law adjudicate some injuries and not others?  What are the 
circumstances that determine the intervention of the law? These questions describe the 
limits  of  tort  law’s effectiveness,  and the limits,  too,  of  its  morality.  According to 
Desmond Manderson, it is the neighbour principle itself that exceeds the language and 
principles  of  tort  law:  a  ‘spirit’  of  responsibility  hovers  outside  the  law,  and  is 
constantly referred to by the law, but cannot be reduced to legal rules.71 The moral 
ethic that forms part of tort law establishes a responsibility that has never been realised 
by the law, and nor has tort  ‘been entirely comfortable’  with this haunting.72 But  I 
wonder  whether  the  language  of  the  law  is  also  haunted  by  a  very  different, 
paradoxical haunting, a haunting of the material, which cannot be captured by moral 
principle.
As described above, the moral principle based on the figure of the neighbour gave rise 
to a particular responsibility that potentially supports vulnerable subjects against the 
utilitarian ethic of social and economic values—values that might sacrifice vulnerable 
individuals to the common good. However, the limitations of the law can be explained 
70 At 583.
71 Manderson, n 3, 31.
72 Ibid 5.
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by focusing on another kind of particularity. Jacques Derrida argues the relationships 
between particularity and universality is the essential question of justice in his essay 
‘The Force of Law’ (1992) and describes the ways in which the law evacuates the 
particular in its application of rules, thereby inherently denying justice.73 Here Derrida 
argues that justice can be distinguished from ‘law’ (droit) because they have different 
relationships  to  particularity  and  universality.  Derrida  described  the  process  of 
adjudication as follows:
Every time…that we placidly apply a good rule to a particular case, to a 
correctly subsumed example, according to a determinant judgment, we 
can be sure that law (droit) may find itself accounted for, but certainly 
not justice. Law (droit) is not justice. Law is the element of calculation, 
and it is just that there be law, but justice is incalculable.74
While law refers to ‘the generality of a rule, a norm or a universal imperative’,75 justice 
‘always addresses itself to singularity, to the singularity of the other’.76 Derrida argues 
that the solution to the problem of the law’s relation to justice is to cease to base legal 
reasoning on the logic of the relation of the particular case to general principle, and to 
forgo adjudication based on a pattern altogether—for all judgment to be a judgment of 
single instances:
In short, for a decision to be just and responsible, it must in its proper 
moment if there is one, be both regulated and without regulation: it must 
conserve the law and also destroy it  or suspend it  enough to have to 
reinvent it in each case, rejustify it, at least reinvent it in the reaffirmation 
and the new and free confirmation of its principle. Each case is other, 
each  decision  is  different  and  requires  an  absolutely  unique 
interpretation, which no existing, coded rule can or ought to guarantee 
absolutely.77
73 Jacques  Derrida,  ‘Force  of  Law:  The  “Mystical  Foundation  of  Authority”’  in  Drucilla  Cornell, 
Michell Rosenfield and David Carlson (eds),  Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice (Routledge 
Books, 1992) 3-67.
74 Ibid 947.
75 Ibid 949.
76 Ibid 955.
77 Ibid 961.
Public Space: The Journal of Law and Social Justice (2010) Vol 5, Art 1, pp 1-26. 24
‘Deconstruction is justice,’ then, only because it indicates law’s status as a practice, a 
‘force, its movement or its motivation’.78 
Similarly, in her seminal work on law and literature, Residues of Justice (1996), Wai- 
Chee Dimock contrasts law’s inadequate treatment of the particular with literature’s 
account. Dimock focuses on the history of the ‘unevenness’ of justice between, on the 
one hand, the ‘two primary languages of justice, law and philosophy,’ which abstract 
particulars into a narrative of universality; and, on the other, the ‘alternative language, 
the language of literature,’ which offers an alternative justice, based on the particular.79 
For Dimock, legal adjudication is not only a process of abstraction, but ‘perhaps an 
exercise  in  reduction  as  well,  stripping  away  apparent  differences  to  reveal  an 
underlying order, an order intelligible,  in the long run, perhaps only in quantitative 
terms’.80 The  law  is  ‘ultimately  a  form  of  reification’,81 a  process  which  makes 
‘warring particulars’ equal. Very little can intervene in this process of reification, and 
therefore Dimock turns to the domain of literature for a better account of justice. In 
some  ways,  Dimock’s  turning  away  from  the  law  fails  to  account  for  the  law’s 
practices. The ‘language of formal universals’ described by Dimock is only one of the 
law’s languages:82 the law is also a site in which a number of different discourses, 
agents,  forces  and  figures  connect  and  contradict.  There  is  much  that  is 
incommensurate and excessive within legal texts, including norms and aesthetics; there 
is also material specificity within the law’s abstractions. Sometimes the law is aware of 
this gap between principle and text, and of these excesses—and those moments are 
both interesting and productive—and sometimes it is not. Dimock looks to literature 
for:
…the abiding presence—the desolation as well as the consolation—of 
what  remains  unredressed,  unrecovered,  noncorresponding.  The 
phenomenon  I  have  in  mind  is  something  like  that  of  being  ‘lost  in 
translation,’  a  phenomenon  at  work  in  any  adjudicative  process,  any 
78 Ibid 945, 957.
79 Wai-chee Dimock, Residues of Justice: Literature, Law, Philosophy (University of California Press, 
1996) 8.
80 Ibid 2.
81 Ibid 6.
82 Ibid 2.
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attempt  to  unify  two  disparate  terms,  to  make  them  conform  to  a 
principle of equivalence.83 
But that which remains unredressed, remains in the legal text, and can be analyzed. 
Dimock turns to literature also for: 
…a  critical  practice  responsive  to  what  we  might  call  the  cognitive 
residues  of  a  text,  responsive  to  what  remains  not  exhausted,  not 
encompassed by its supposed resolution.84
Yet legal  texts  are  also  haunted.  The law uses  logic,  fictions  and devices  to  form 
decisions based on commensurability;  but  the excesses remain  in  the text.  In legal 
cases there is a surprising amount of material that is imaginative, irrational, subjective, 
and  contradictory  to  the  final  decision,  to  dominant  legal  theory  and  to  dominant 
culture.  In  case  law  there  is  always  play  between  the  very  particular  factual 
circumstances with which the court is presented and general principles, a dialectic that 
moves  back  and  forth,  and  which  is  never  adequately  resolved. Mabel  Hannah 
continues to be a presence in tort law, as one of its haunting figures. Officially, she is a 
figure of consumer disappointment and mild trauma; unofficially, her suffering marks 
the ways in which the law, in its adjudication of injuries, is partial and selective. The 
question is  whether  this  haunting  and excessive  can be incorporated  by the law—
whether the law is capable of a self-reflexive move that would include awareness of 
the injuries it is able to adjudicate. Is the law capable of recognising whose suffering 
matters to it, and why?
83 Ibid 6.
84 Ibid 141.
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